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ENRICHING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE:
SEEKING TO IMPROVE THE RETENTION
VOTE PHASE OF AN APPOINTIVE
SELECTION SYSTEM
Honorable John F. Irwin* and
Daniel L. Real**
[I]ndependence of the judges is . . .  requisite to guard the Con-
stitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill
humors, which the arts of designing men, or the influence of par-
ticular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people
themselves, and which, though they speedily give place to better
information, and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in
the meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations in the govern-
ment, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the
community.1
The reformer is careless of numbers, disregards popularity, and
deals only with ideas, conscience, and common sense. He feels,
with Copernicus, that as God waited long for an interpreter, so
he can wait for his followers.2
* Judge Irwin is one of the original six members of the Nebraska Court of Ap-
peals, created in 1991.  He served as Chief Judge from September 1998 through Sep-
tember 2004.  He served as President of the National Council of Chief Judges in 2005.
He currently chairs the Nebraska Supreme Court Judicial Branch Education Advisory
Committee and the Nebraska Judicial Ethics Committee, and co-chairs the Nebraska
Criminal and Juvenile Justice Subcommittee of the Minority and Justice Task Force.
He also is an officer of the Appellate Judges Council of the American Bar Associa-
tion.  He currently teaches Appellate Litigation at Creighton University School of
Law.
** Daniel L. Real is a 1995 graduate, magna cum laude, of Creighton University
School of Law.  He has served as a career judicial staff attorney for the Nebraska
Court of Appeals since 1995.  In addition, he has been an adjunct faculty member at
Creighton University School of Law in Omaha, Nebraska, since 1999, teaching in the
Legal Writing & Lawyering Skills program.  He is also the author of scholarly articles.
See Daniel L. Real, Appellate Practice in Nebraska: A Thorough, Though Not Exhaus-
tive, Primer in How To Do It and How To Be More Effective, 39 Creighton L. Rev. 29
(2005); Daniel L. Real, Appellate Practice in Nebraska: A Primer in How To Be More
Effective, NEB. LAW. MAG., July 2006, at 5.
1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter, ed.,
1961).
2. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION AND THE
MEN WHO MADE IT 136 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1973) (1948) (quoting Wendell
Phillips).
453
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I. INTRODUCTION
Judicial independence and reform seem inextricably intertwined.
Even as Alexander Hamilton eloquently argued for the importance
of an independent judiciary, the history of our states reveals the
difficulty in evolving the best possible system of judicial selection
to achieve optimum independence and quality.  The inherent resis-
tance to change and the premium to be placed on patience in
would-be reformers further complicate the discussion.  As the re-
cent symposium at Fordham Law School revealed, a panoply of
ideas exists about how to most effectively continue moving toward
the ideal system of selecting state court judges.  Toward that end,
this Essay seeks to address a relatively narrow aspect of the issue:
the struggle to improve the effectiveness of judicial retention elec-
tions in an appointive selection system.  This Essay will start by
reviewing the framework of the existing system of selection and
retention in Nebraska.  It will consider why an appointive system
might need, or want, to maintain elective retention.  Next, this Es-
say will consider some of the potential problems related to the ef-
fectiveness of existing appointive systems that employ retention
elections.  This Essay will conclude with some proposals for im-
proving the effectiveness of the retention vote in Nebraska and
similarly situated states.
II. A LOOK AT NEBRASKA’S EXISTING SYSTEM OF
JUDICIAL SELECTION
Nebraska’s judiciary consists of a supreme court, an intermediate
court of appeals, district courts, county courts, juvenile courts, and
a workers’ compensation court.3  All judges in Nebraska are ap-
pointed by the governor, who chooses from a list of candidates sub-
mitted by a judicial nominating commission.4  Once appointed,
judges in Nebraska must stand for periodic non-partisan retention
votes.5  The Nebraska Constitution, the Nebraska Statutes, and the
Nebraska Supreme Court Rules set forth the details of Nebraska’s
system of judicial selection.6
3. See NEB. CONST. art. V, § 27 (establishing the Juvenile Courts); NEB. CONST.
art. V, § 2 (establishing the Supreme Court); NEB. CONST. art. V, § 9 (establishing the
District Courts); NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-1101 (2006) (establishing the Court of Ap-
peals); NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-503 (establishing the County Courts); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 48-152 (establishing the Workers’ Compensation Court).
4. See infra notes 7-27 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 7-29 and accompanying text.
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Nebraska’s existing system of judicial selection is prescribed by
the Nebraska Constitution.7  At Nebraska’s inception, Nebraska
Supreme Court justices were selected by popular election to six-
year terms.8  Similarly, in 1875, Nebraska began selecting district
court judges by popular election to four-year terms and county
court judges by popular election to two-year terms.9  In 1909, the
Nebraska Legislature adopted the Nonpartisan Judiciary Act,
which barred judicial candidates from official affiliation with any
political party.10  In 1962, Nebraska approved a constitutional
amendment adopting a “merit plan for selection of judges” of the
Nebraska Supreme Court and the district courts (“the plan”).11
Nebraska extended the plan to include county court judges in
1974.12  In 1990, Nebraska approved a constitutional amendment
creating the Nebraska Court of Appeals, whose judges are also se-
lected by the plan.13 The plan also governs judicial selection for
Nebraska’s juvenile courts and workers’ compensation court.14
The plan dictates that judicial vacancies “shall be filled by the
Governor from a list of at least two nominees presented to him by
the appropriate judicial nominating commission.”15  Nebraska has
separate judicial nominating commissions for various geographic
areas within the state, and a separate commission for the Chief Jus-
tice of the Supreme Court.16  Each judicial nominating commission
7. NEB. CONST. art. V, § 21.
8. See Amer. Judicature Soc’y, Nebraska History of Judicial Selection Reform,
http://www.ajs.org/js/NE_history.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2006) [hereinafter AJS,
Nebraska Judicial Selection] (summarizing the history of judicial selection in
Nebraska).
9. Id.
10. Id. But see State ex rel. Ragan v. Junkin, 122 N.W. 473, 474 (Neb. 1909) (ruling
that Nonpartisan Judiciary Act violated freedom of speech).
11. NEB. CONST. art. V, § 21; see also AJS, Nebraska Judicial Selection, supra note
8.
12. AJS, Nebraska Judicial Selection, supra note 8.
13. Id.; see also NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-1101 (2006) (concerning creation of Ne-
braska Court of Appeals and selection of judges thereto).
14. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-2117 (concerning juvenile courts); see also NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 48-152 to -.01 (concerning workers’ compensation court).
15. NEB. CONST. art. V, § 21(1).
16. See NEB. CONST. art. V, § 21(4); see also NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 24-801 to -812
(2005) (governing judicial nominating commissions); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-2117 (gov-
erning judicial nominating commissions for vacancies in the separate juvenile courts);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-152 to -.01 (governing judicial nominating commissions for
vacancies in the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court); Marks v. Judicial Nomi-
nating Comm’n, 461 N.W.2d 551, 553 (Neb. 1990) (holding that §§ 24-801 to -812.01
constitute a complete and independent legislative act covering the subject of judicial
nominating commissions); Amer. Judicature Soc’y, Nebraska Current Methods of Ju-
dicial Selection, http://www.ajs.org/js/NE_methods.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2006)
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consists of nine members: one Supreme Court justice designated by
the governor to serve as a non-voting chairperson; four state bar
association members; and four citizens of the relevant judicial dis-
trict who are not admitted to the practice of law before the Ne-
braska courts.17  Additionally, no more than two lawyers and two
non-lawyers within each commission may be members of the same
political party.18  Commission members serve staggered four-year
terms.19
A public hearing must be held within sixty days after the final
determination that a judicial vacancy exists.20  Any lawyer who
meets the requirements to serve as a judge may signify her interest
in being appointed to fill the judicial vacancy by filing an appropri-
ate application at least twenty-one days prior to the scheduled pub-
lic hearing.21  Any member of the public is “entitled to attend the
public hearing to express, either orally or in writing, his or her
views concerning candidates for the judicial vacancy.”22  After the
public hearing, the judicial nominating commission can hold addi-
tional private meetings, receive additional information in writing,
and make independent investigation and inquiry as it deems neces-
sary to evaluate the qualifications of the candidates.23  The judicial
nominating commission is even empowered, if it feels it is neces-
sary, to institute a search for additional candidates and to hold fur-
ther public hearings.24  The judicial nominating commission
forwards to the governor the names of candidates who received at
least five votes from the voting members of the nominating
commission.25
[hereinafter AJS, Nebraska Current Methods] (noting that there are a total of thirty-
three commissions: one for the Chief Justice of the Nebraska Supreme Court, and one
for each district of the supreme court, the court of appeals, the district court, and the
courts of limited jurisdiction).
17. See NEB. CONST. art. V, § 21(4); see also NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 24-802 to -809
(2006) (providing residence requirements for judicial nominating commission
members).
18. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 24-803(1) (concerning non-lawyer members), 24-
806(1) (concerning lawyer members); see also AJS, Nebraska Current Methods, supra
note 16 (noting that no more than two lawyer members and two non-lawyer members
may be members of same political party).
19. NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-803(1).
20. Id. § 24-810(1).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. § 24-810(2).
24. Id. § 24-810(3).
25. NEB. CONST. art. V, § 21(5); NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-809.
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After the names of qualified candidates are forwarded to the
governor, the governor has sixty days to appoint a candidate to fill
the judicial vacancy.26  If the governor fails to make an appoint-
ment within sixty days, the Chief Justice or the acting Chief Justice
of the Nebraska Supreme Court shall make the appointment.27
Sitting judges who wish to remain on the bench must submit
themselves to periodic non-partisan retention votes.  “At the next
general election following the expiration of three years from the
date of appointment . . . and every six years thereafter as long as
such judge retains office, [every sitting judge in Nebraska] shall
have his right to remain in office subject to approval or rejection by
the electorate.”28  In the case of the Chief Justice of the Nebraska
Supreme Court, the electorate of the entire state votes on the ques-
tion of retention; in the case of all other judges, the electorate of
the district from which the judge was appointed votes on the ques-
tion of retention.29  A simple majority of voters indicating that the
judge should be retained is all that is required for successful
retention.
The Nebraska State Bar Association’s judiciary committee eval-
uates Nebraska judges.30  To this end, the committee circulates ju-
dicial performance surveys to the state bar and attorneys complete
the surveys by answering questions about judges standing for re-
tention with whom the attorneys have had professional contact.31
The survey asks attorneys to rate judges on a number of criteria,
and also includes a question specifically asking the respondent
whether the judge should be retained in office.32  The results of the
evaluation are available to the public on the bar association web-
site and by circulation to the state print media.33  Additionally, the
bar association makes available to voters who request it a “Judicial
Retention Information Kit,” which includes a letter emphasizing
26. See NEB. CONST. art V, § 21(1).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See AJS, Nebraska Judicial Selection, supra note 8 (noting Nebraska State Bar
Association’s evaluation of Nebraska judges); see also Neb. State Bar Ass’n, Public
Information: Judicial Evaluation, http://www.nebar.com/publicinfo/judicial_eval.htm
(last visited Nov. 27, 2006) [hereinafter Nebraska Bar, Judicial Evaluation] (contain-
ing links to past judicial evaluation questionnaires and results).
31. See AJS, Nebraska Judicial Selection, supra note 8 (noting Nebraska State Bar
Association’s evaluation of Nebraska judges).
32. Id; see also Nebraska Bar, Judicial Evaluation, supra note 30 (containing links
to past judicial evaluation questionnaires and results).
33. See Nebraska Bar, Judicial Evaluation, supra note 30 (containing links to past
judicial evaluation questionnaires and results).
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the importance of having an independent judiciary, guidelines to
be considered in evaluating judges sitting for retention, back-
ground information about the judicial performance survey, survey
results, and biographical information about those judges sitting for
retention.34
III. KEEPING ELECTIVE RETENTION IN AN APPOINTIVE
SELECTION SYSTEM
Many reformers argue for improving both independence and ef-
fectiveness in the judiciary by replacing elective retention with an
entirely commission-based retention system.35  Although the opti-
mal goal might well be to someday move toward commission-based
retention, there are good reasons to first consider keeping elective
retention while striving to improve the effectiveness of the reten-
tion vote.  There are both historical and practical reasons for pre-
mising the current discussion on maintaining elective retention.36
Evidence also suggests that the purposes and goals of judicial re-
tention systems can effectively be achieved with an improved elec-
tive retention system.
As an initial matter, it is important to recognize the historical
reason for many appointive selection systems including elective re-
34. See, e.g., Letter from John P. Grant, President, Neb. State Bar Ass’n, to Fellow
Nebraskan (Oct. 8, 2004), http://www.nebar.com/pdfs/judiciary/mcletter.pdf.
35. For example, in the keynote address presented at the Washington State Sum-
mit on Judicial Selection and Judicial Independence at Seattle University School of
Law on November 1, 2005, American Bar Association President Michael S. Greco
noted that the ABA’s latest policy statement on judicial selection and independence
in state courts, adopted in 2003, outlined a preferred system of selection that included,
as a first preference, a recommendation that judges be reappointed by a commission.
See Michael S. Greco, President, ABA, Keynote Address at Seattle University School
of Law: Wash. State Summit on Judicial Selection and Judicial Independence (Nov.
11, 2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/op/greco/speeches/washington_st_sum-
mit_jud_selection_11-11-05.doc; see also N.Y. COUNTY LAWYERS’ ASS’N, JUDICIAL
SELECTION IN NEW YORK STATE: A ROADMAP TO REFORM, available at http://www
.nycla.org/sitefiles/publications/publications248_0.pdf (last visited Nov. 27, 2006) (in-
cluding a recommendation that New York adopt a system of reappointment of judges
entirely determined by judicial selection panels).  Similarly, Connecticut employs a
method of judicial reappointment that is based on nominations by the governor and
reappointment by the Connecticut General Assembly.  In 1986 Connecticut estab-
lished a “Judicial Selection Commission” to evaluate and recommend candidates and
incumbent judges for nomination by the governor. See LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM RE-
VIEW AND INVESTIGATIONS COMM., CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY, JUDICIAL SELECTION
REPORT (FINAL) ch. III (2000), available at  http://www.cga.ct.gov/pri/archives/2000js
reportchap3.htm (describing Connecticut’s judicial selection process); Amer. Judica-
ture Soc’y, History of Judicial Selection Reform in Connecticut, http://www.ajs.org/js/
CT_history.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2006).
36. See infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
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tention.  Initial reformers of judicial selection sought to remove the
actual and perceived possibility of corruption associated with polit-
ical elections.37  To that end, reformers proposed various appoin-
tive selection systems, such as the nominating commission system
put in place in Nebraska.38  Those reformers, however, recognized
that the public would not be eager to entirely forfeit its say in se-
lecting judges.39  Additionally, initial reformers recognized that
elections provide a means of public accountability for the effective-
ness of judicial performance.40  As a result, the compromise for at-
tempting to reduce corruption while allowing the public a more
direct voice than representation by a commission was to remove
the elections on the “front end” of the process at selection, but
maintain elections on the “back end” of the process at retention.41
Practically speaking, the same problems that faced initial reform-
ers continue to be problems today.  As demonstrated by recent
public controversy and media attention surrounding, inter alia,
United States Supreme Court nominees John Roberts and Samuel
Alito, “judicial independence” and “accountability” have become
media buzzwords, and public scrutiny of the judiciary is continually
reaching new heights.42  In this climate, it is unrealistic to expect
the public to accept less direct involvement in judicial selection and
retention.  As such, just as initial reformers compromised by main-
taining elective retention, the current public discourse suggests that
maintaining elective retention will likely be necessary, at least in
the short term.
Not only is it likely necessary to consider maintaining elective
retention, but evidence suggests that elective retention can be ef-
fective in furthering the purposes and goals of retention systems
generally.  For purposes of this Essay, there are fundamentally two
37. See William K. Hall & Larry T. Aspin, What Twenty Years of Judicial Retention
Elections Have Told Us, 70 JUDICATURE 340, 340-41 (1987) [hereinafter Hall & Aspin,
Twenty Years].
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. For example, a recent Slate article discussed the sudden appearance of a num-
ber of state ballot initiatives appearing on November 2006 ballots across the country
that pose serious threats to judicial independence under the guise of additional ac-
countability. See Posting of Bert Brandenburg to http://www.slate.com/id/2146762/
(July 28, 2006, 16:13 EST); see also Brennan Center Fair Courts E-Lert Topic Defend-
ing Judicial Independence, http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/pester/pages/view
_elerts.php?category_id=7 (last visited Nov. 27, 2006) (listing more than 140 media
articles on the subject of judicial independence between January 2000 and August
2006).
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different kinds of purposes and goals to consider: improving the
quality of judicial performance and fostering public participation in
all three branches of government.43  Elective retention can be ef-
fective for both.
First, an effective retention system should play a meaningful role
in improving the quality of judicial performance.  In this sense, ju-
dicial performance entails both “competent” discharge of judicial
duties and “temperate” discharge of judicial duties.  The “high
quality of judicial performance” purpose of retention is itself a
two-sided consideration.  On the one hand, an effective retention
system should serve to ensure that truly substandard judicial per-
formance, either in terms of competence or temperance, results in
removal from the bench.  On the other hand, an effective retention
system should also serve to promote truly high standards in judicial
performance.  As such, an effective retention system should strive
to promote a “high bar” for measuring judicial performance and
then ensure that judicial performance that fails to reach that bar
results in removal from the bench.
Second, an effective retention system should foster public partic-
ipation in the judicial branch of government that is in some way
comparable to public participation in the executive and legislative
branches of government.  Although all three branches of govern-
ment should be considered ostensibly co-equal, and although each
branch of government plays an important role in the system of
checks and balances that ensures efficient operation of the others,
the public generally does not seem to understand its role in ensur-
ing quality in the judicial branch like it does in ensuring quality in
the other two branches.  Inasmuch as the public should rightly de-
mand a role in ensuring quality in the judicial branch, an effective
retention system should foster meaningful public participation.
The obvious difficulty in seeking to maximize the effectiveness of
a judicial retention system is striking an appropriate balance be-
tween the needs and utility of judicial impartiality on the one hand
and the need for judicial quality and public accountability on the
other hand.  As both a historical and a practical matter, reform
should begin with considering how to maintain elective retention
and how to allow the public a direct participatory role in retention.
As discussed below, evidence suggests that elective retention can
be effective in furthering the purposes of and goals of judicial re-
43. See infra Part VI.
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tention, both from a judicial quality perspective and from a public
participation standpoint.
IV. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH RETENTION VOTES IN
APPOINTIVE SYSTEMS
As described earlier, Nebraska currently uses a basic non-parti-
san elective retention system.  Sitting judges stand for periodic re-
tention votes, and their names appear on general election ballots,
although the retention election is not a partisan political event.
The current system in Nebraska, and similarly situated states, how-
ever, does suffer from some basic deficiencies that prevent the sys-
tem from fully ensuring the purposes of judicial quality and public
participation.  In this regard, however, the deficiencies overlap
greatly and can generally be divided into problems associated with
non-participation by the public and problems associated with inef-
fective participation by the public.
First, elective retention systems suffer from the problem of non-
participation by the public.  “Voter roll-off,” or the phenomenon of
a voter casting votes for higher profile issues on the ballot, such as
executive and legislative offices, but not casting votes on matters of
judicial retention, is widely recognized.44  Indeed, statistical data
suggest that judicial retention elections are “generally character-
ized by low voter turnout” and that “judicial retention elections
attract the smallest turnout of all the types of judicial elections.”45
Statistical studies have indicated that voter roll-off averaged ap-
proximately 36% between 1976 and 1984, 32.4% between 1986 and
1996, and 29.5% in 1998.46  This phenomenon undermines the ef-
fectiveness of the elective retention system with regard to both ju-
dicial quality and public participation.
Inasmuch as an effective judicial retention system should strive
to achieve a good balance of promoting judicial quality and impar-
tiality (“judicial impartiality/quality”) on the one hand and pro-
moting public participation and accountability (“public
participation/accountability”) on the other hand, non-participation
by the voting public can seriously undermine the desired balance.
For example, if a significant portion of the voting public chooses
44. See Hall & Aspin, Twenty Years, supra note 37, at 342; see also William K. Hall
& Larry T. Aspin, The Rolloff Effect in Judicial Retention Elections, 24 SOC. SCI. J.
415, 415 (1987).
45. Hall & Aspin, Twenty Years, supra note 37, at 342.
46. Larry Aspin, Trends in Judicial Retention Elections 1964-1998, 83 JUDICATURE
79, 79 (1999).
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-1\FUJ116.txt unknown Seq: 10  4-APR-07 10:28
462 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIV
not to participate in a judicial retention election, then sitting judges
arguably have less imperative to act impartially and to strive for
high standards of competence and temperance because a signifi-
cant portion of the voting public will choose not to exercise any
public accountability of the judges’ performance.  If a judicial dis-
trict is comprised of 1000 voters, but only 700 cast votes on a par-
ticular judge’s retention, then the judge might actually need
approval from only 351 voters, or slightly more than one-third of
the voting public; this need for approval from only one-third,
rather than one-half, of the voting public certainly undermines the
balance of judicial impartiality/quality and public participation/
accountability.
Second, elective retention systems also suffer from the problem
of ineffective participation by the public.  Even among the voting
public that participates in judicial retention elections, some per-
centage of voters traditionally will vote “yes” or “no” on judges,
either for no discernible reason, or for the “wrong” reason.  For
example, some voters will simply vote “no” on retention for any
judge, either because of a generalized distrust of public officials, as
a reaction to crime rates, or because of a negative experience with
the judicial system, rather than discerning specific judges who
should not be retained.  Similarly, some voters will simply vote
“yes” on retention for any judge without considering whether each
individual judge should or should not be retained.  Discussion at
this symposium suggested that as much as 25 to 30% of participat-
ing voters always vote “no” on retention, regardless of judicial per-
formance evaluation recommendations.47
The problem of ineffective voter participation also disrupts the
desired balance of judicial impartiality/quality and public participa-
tion/accountability, and arguably does so in an even more damag-
ing manner than non-participation.  Take, for example, the
hypothetical scenario above where only 700 of the 1000 voters in a
particular district choose to participate in the judicial retention
election.  Not only is the determination of whether a particular
judge should remain on the bench left to a smaller voting public,
but the determination may be severely skewed by the portion of
those 700 voters who participate with either no discernible reason
for casting a particular vote or with improper motivating forces
driving a particular vote.
47. Thomas F. Whelan, Symposium on the Best Appointive System for the Selection
of State Court Judges, 22 SUFFOLK LAW. APR. 2006, at 24, 25 (2006).
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V. POSSIBLE UNDERLYING REASONS FOR THE PROBLEMS
Both non-participation and ineffective participation result in
similar disruptions to the desired balance of judicial impartiality
and competence on the one hand and public participation and ac-
countability on the other hand.  It is not enough, however, to sim-
ply recognize that the current system has problems that undermine
the goals of an effective judicial retention system.  It is also neces-
sary to consider the possible underlying reasons for non-participa-
tion and ineffective participation by the voting public, so that
suggestions can be made to address the underlying causes and,
hopefully, to address the ultimate problems and make the elective
retention system more effective.
Several of the major underlying reasons for the voting public’s
non-participation or ineffective participation in judicial retention
elections fall under the broad umbrella of “education.”  These “ed-
ucation” related issues include the public’s general lack of under-
standing about the judicial branch in general and about retention
elections in particular, the lack of available resources to inform the
public about judicial independence and performance, and the effi-
cacy of the resources that are available.  Each of these issues con-
tributes both to voter non-participation and ineffective
participation.
Although American public education includes significant in-
struction in government, including the three branches of govern-
ment, the actual workings of the judicial system are not a
prominent part of most curricula.48  With respect to national gov-
ernment, students are taught: (a) details about the Electoral Col-
lege, including presidential succession and other details about the
executive branch; and (b) details about how legislation is crafted,
debated, and passed, and details about the composition and elec-
tion of senators and representatives.  Students are taught compara-
tively very little about the Supreme Court Justice nomination
process, Congress’ advice and consent powers, or the process
48. This statement, as well as the general observations that follow in this para-
graph, are largely matters of the authors’ personal observation bolstered by personal
discussions with educators and citizens in the authors’ local community.  The general
observations, however, are illustrated and confirmed by observing sources such as
Social Studies Help, http://www.socialstudieshelp.com, a website that provides assis-
tance for, inter alia, high school advanced placement government students.  Although
this website provides information about a variety of theoretical and practical topics,
the website fails to provide information about the process of judicial selection or re-
tention. See The Soc. Studies Help Ctr., Homepage, http://www.socialstudieshelp.com
(last visited Nov. 27, 2006).
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through which the Supreme Court chooses, hears, or decides cases.
With respect to state government, students are similarly taught de-
tails about the selection and workings of the executive and legisla-
tive branches of government, but very little about the judicial
branch, other than its existence as a third branch.  Beyond the gen-
eral lack of education about the judicial branch, the voting public is
generally uneducated about judicial retention elections; specifically
the voting public is uneducated about the ideal purposes and goals
of judicial retention elections.
The lack of education about the judiciary and retention elections
results in a substantially diminished pool of voters with a meaning-
ful understanding of judicial independence, judicial impartiality,
and judicial quality to seek out the kind of information that would
allow meaningful participation in a retention election.  The voters
who are informed and do desire such information, however, will
encounter the next obstacle: the lack of available resources to in-
form the voter.49  Currently there are very few resources available
to inform voters about judicial independence, judicial retention, or
specific judicial performance.  The Nebraska State Bar Associa-
tion’s website contains links to helpful resources, but even those
resources are limited.50  There is no indication that a significant
portion of the voting public is even aware of the website or the
resources contained therein.  Additionally, the bar association’s
website is only one source of information.  Other sources of infor-
mation, such as print, television, and radio media, generally pro-
vide very few resources about most judicial retention elections.
While traditional print, television, and radio media devote signifi-
cant time to coverage of executive and legislative elections, they
generally provide very little coverage about particular judges
standing for retention, and then usually provide only negative cov-
erage about a particular judge who has been targeted for non-re-
tention.  As such, rather than providing their audiences with
meaningful information about the judicial branch of government,
retention elections, and the information that voters need to make
49. See, e.g., Hall & Aspin, Twenty Years, supra note 37, at 342 (“Some voters do
not vote in judicial retention elections because they lack enough information to cast
an informed vote.”); David B. Rottman & Roy A. Schotland, What Makes Judicial
Elections Unique?, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1369, 1371-72 (2001) (“Starting as long as
forty-five years ago, exit polls and other polls have shown a startling lack of voter
awareness of even the names of [judicial] candidates.”).
50. See Neb. State Bar Ass’n Home Page, http://www.nebar.com (last visited Nov.
27, 2006).
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informed decisions about particular judges, these media tend to
largely overlook judicial retention elections.
Finally, even those voters who are able to overcome the general
lack of education about the judiciary, who take a personal interest
in learning about the judiciary and understanding retention elec-
tions, and who make an effort to seek out available information
from sources such as traditional media or the bar association, will
face the additional difficulty that the few available resources are
generally inadequate to foster a meaningful decision.  As noted
above, the bar association circulates judicial performance surveys
for completion by attorneys.  The surveys, however, ask only a
handful of questions about each particular judge (ranging from less
than ten questions for appellate court judges to less than fifteen
questions for trial court judges), are typically general in nature
(such as asking for a rating from “excellent” to “very poor” on
“Legal Analysis,” “Judicial Temperament and Demeanor,” or
“Trial Management”), and provide very little opportunity for any
meaningful explanation of an attorney’s answers.51
In addition to the education-oriented issues that contribute to
retention elections being less effective than possible, retention
elections also suffer from being particularly susceptible to influ-
ence by political agendas.  Partly because of voter drop-off and the
underlying education-oriented problems already discussed, special
interest groups can sometimes use retention elections to further
political agendas and can take advantage of unknowing voters.
One example of this phenomenon was the non-retention of Ne-
braska Supreme Court Justice David Lanphier in 1996.
Justice Lanphier was not accused of judicial malfeasance or in-
competence; rather, the political campaign that led to his removal
from the bench was spearheaded by a special interest group with a
political agenda, which used public frustration over selected deci-
sions rendered by the Nebraska Supreme Court to garner public
support for his non-retention.52  While on the Nebraska Supreme
Court, Justice Lanphier participated in a number of decisions in-
volving term limits and Nebraska’s second-degree murder statute.53
In response to a unanimous decision of the Nebraska Supreme
Court holding unconstitutional a term limits amendment passed
51. See Nebraska Bar, Judicial Evaluation, supra note 30 (containing links to past
judicial evaluation questionnaires and results).
52. See Traciel V. Reid, The Politicization of Retention Elections: Lessons from the
Defeat of Justices Lanphier and White, 83 JUDICATURE 68, 70-71 (1999).
53. Id. at 70.
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through Nebraska’s initiative process, advocates of term limits
seized on public sentiment concerning a number of Nebraska Su-
preme Court decisions overturning second-degree murder convic-
tions to mount a public campaign to vote Justice Lanphier out of
office.54  Only two months prior to the 1996 election in which Jus-
tice Lanphier stood for retention, founders of an organization
called “Citizens for Responsible Judges” cited Lanphier’s “disre-
gard for the safety of [Nebraska] communities” and Lanphier’s
“willingness to set convicted murderers free on minor technicali-
ties” while waging a very public and political campaign against
him.55  Ultimately Justice Lanphier was not retained in office, with
only approximately 38% of the public voting in favor of
retention.56
VI. PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING THE RETENTION
VOTE SYSTEM
Identifying the apparent problems with existing elective reten-
tion systems and understanding the possible underlying reasons for
those problems is the first step toward proposing meaningful re-
form.  The next step is to address those concerns in a way that
helps achieve the best possible system of retention, ensure opti-
mum independence and optimum quality members of the judiciary,
and recognize the inherent resistance to change that could compli-
cate reform efforts.  Additionally, meaningful reform should seek
to provide both short-term improvements and long-term systemic
change.
As a preliminary matter, it bears noting that elective retention
can be effective.  A 1991 study of over 900 judges from ten states
who had actually stood for retention in retention elections con-
cluded that elective retention systems actually influence the behav-
ior of judges, both with respect to the rendering of competent
decisions and temperament on the bench.57  Surveyed judges indi-
cated that, in their opinions, the best ways to win retention elec-
tions are to perform competently, to be fair and impartial, to
manage cases well, and to be knowledgeable.58  The survey indi-
cated that the vast majority of judges self-report that their behavior
54. Id. at 70-71.
55. Id. at 70.
56. Id. at 72.
57. Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, Retention Elections and Judicial Behavior,
77 JUDICATURE 306, 312-13 (1994).
58. Id.
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and performance on the bench are influenced by the accountability
of having to stand for retention elections.59  Further, differences in
the vote results between judges appearing on the same ballot sug-
gest that voters do discern between judges, at least somewhat and
albeit perhaps for unclear or improper reasons.  For example, in
the same 1996 retention election in which Justice Lanphier was not
retained (as discussed above) by a vote of approximately 60%
against retention and 40% in favor of retention, other judges ap-
pearing immediately after Justice Lanphier on the ballot were re-
tained by votes of 70% or more in favor of retention.60
One approach to reforming judicial retention elections in states
like Nebraska is to implement steps toward systemic change.
These steps should include reforming education about the judicial
branch at the “academic” level, increasing the amount of public
information available about the judicial branch, and improving the
quality of information available about the judicial branch.  These
steps can provide some short-term improvement in the meaningful-
ness and effectiveness of judicial retention elections, and can also
provide long-term systemic change.
First, changes need to be made to improve “education” about
the judicial branch.  Although “education” is often a popular
buzzword for reform efforts, to effect meaningful improvement in
judicial retention elections, education must encompass far more
than just voter guides and other adult education tools.  Rather,
changes need to be made at the academic level to promote more
significant education about the judicial branch.  School curricula
need to include education about the workings of the judicial
branch, the mechanisms of judicial selection and retention, and the
importance of an independent and highly competent judiciary.  It is
vital that students begin learning about the judicial branch as a co-
equal branch of government and about the role of the public in
ensuring an independent judiciary.  Employing school curricula in
this manner will change attitudes about the judiciary’s role in gov-
ernment, and will begin to foster an attitude and an interest in the
public at a younger age that will translate into future voters who
are more meaningfully involved in utilizing and optimizing judicial
59. Id.
60. Judge Irwin’s election results in the 1996 retention election provide an exam-
ple.  Judge Irwin represents the same judicial district on the Nebraska Court of Ap-
peals as Justice Lanphier did on the Nebraska Supreme Court.  Judge Irwin’s name
appeared on the ballot immediately below Justice Lanphier’s name, and Judge Irwin
received a “yes” vote of more than 70%, almost exactly the opposite of Justice
Lanphier’s vote.
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retention elections.  Although the fruits of academic curricula re-
form may not be apparent for some years to come, long-term plan-
ning should be a part of any meaningful reform effort.
There is some empirical precedent for the suggestion that educa-
tional efforts related to the law can generate significant youth in-
terest in a relatively short period of time.  For example, mock trial
programs, which teach young people about the process of how a
typical trial might proceed, are now hugely popular and common in
schools of all sizes across the country.61  But the mock trial pro-
gram has only recently become widespread.  In just the past few
years, this program, which started as a somewhat isolated and
grassroots program, has grown in popularity and serves as an ex-
ample of how quickly educational reform about the judiciary might
take hold.62
Second, in addition to educational reform aimed at creating
more interested and informed voters in the future, reform should
also strive to make more public information available for today’s
voters.  As noted above, the public information currently available
on the subject of judicial retention is primarily limited to bar
surveys, the results of which are not widely distributed or sought,
and are given only limited coverage in print media.63  It is true that
the Nebraska State Bar Association has taken steps in recent years
to make information, such as the bar survey results and a “Judicial
Retention Information Kit,” available to voters on the bar associa-
tion website.64  It is not apparent that a significant portion of the
voting public is aware of the availability of these resources or is
capable of accessing these resources.  Further, it is apparent that
these limited resources are simply not enough to provide sufficient
information to both foster interest and involvement and to make
involvement meaningful.
As such, reform efforts aimed at providing more information to
current voters should be broad reaching and varied.  For example,
61. For example, a recent Google search for “high school mock trial programs”
yielded approximately 2,000,000 results which included links to the programs estab-
lished in high schools all across the country. See Google.com, High School Mock Trial
Programs–Google Search, http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&lr=&q=highschool+
mock+trial+programs&btng=search (last visited Nov.27, 2006) (yielding 2,040,000
results).
62. See Nat’l High Sch. Mock Trial Championship, http://www.nationalmocktrial
.org/history.cfm (last visited Nov. 27, 2006) (documenting the growth in participation
in the national tournament from five states in 1984 to forty states and three foreign
countries in 2006).
63. See supra Part V.
64. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
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a series of public forums should be established, held in venues all
across the state on the subjects of judicial impartiality, judicial se-
lection, and judicial retention.65  Such forums could help to make
the current voting public more aware of the current system of judi-
cial selection in Nebraska, the current system of retention elec-
tions, and the purposes and goals of such a retention system, as
well as the importance of the public’s meaningful participation.  In
addition to public forums, traditional media should be encouraged
to provide more consistent coverage of these topics, rather than
only providing coverage of the most controversial judicial decisions
or the most public campaigns seeking the ouster of sitting judges.
Further, public service groups that currently participate in voter
education—groups such as the League of Women Voters66—should
also be encouraged to make the judiciary and judicial retention
elections a part of their voter education efforts.  Public interest
groups that hold meetings or invite guest speakers on topics of in-
terest to the group could provide a valuable outlet for more judicial
branch and judicial retention education.
Third, in addition to starting the educational process concerning
the judiciary and judicial retention earlier and increasing the avail-
ability of resources to educate current voters, it is vital that the
reform process seek to improve the quality of information availa-
ble to the voting public.  One way to improve the quality of infor-
65. A recent decision by a Nebraska district court judge sentencing to probation a
defendant convicted of sexual assault on a child drew a fair amount of local and na-
tional media coverage. See, e.g., Too Short Prison Sentence Protested, WASH.
TIMES.COM, May 27, 2006, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/2006
0526-110743-2455r.htm. Among the local criticism were comments from people who
decried how judges like this “get elected to the bench,” as well as the suggestion from
some to make note of the judge’s name for the next time she stood for a retention
vote.  Such comments seem indicative of the fact that although some voters are at
least somewhat aware of Nebraska’s system of judicial selection and retention, others
are still under the mistaken belief that judges are initially “elected” to the bench. See
Ed Howard, No Child Molester is too Small to go to Prison, NEBRASKA
STATEPAPER.COM, May 26, 2006, available at http://nebraska.statepaper.com/vnews/
display.v/ART/2006/05/26/44774afe205d7?in_archive=1; see also Posting of Darrell to
No Child Molester is too Small to go to Prison, http://nebraska.statepaper.com/vnews/
display.v/ART/2006/05/26/44774afe205d7?in_archive=1 (May 30, 2006); Posting of
Gerald F. Pond to No Child Molester is too Small to go to Prison, http://nebraska.state
paper.com/vnews/display.v/ART/2006/05/26/44774afe205d7?in_archive=1 (May 29,
2006); Postings of Husker_Mama to No Child Molester is too Small to go to Prison,
http://nebraska.statepaper.com/vnews/display.v/ART/2006/05/26/44774afe205d7?in_
archive=1 (May 26, 2006, May 30, 2006, and June 1, 2006); Posting of radicalron to No
Child Molester is too Small to go to Prison, http://nebraska.statepaper.com/vnews/dis-
play.v/ART/2006/05/26/44774afe205d7?in_archive=1 (May 30, 2006).
66. See League of Women Voters Homepage, http://www.lwv.org (last visited Nov.
27, 2006).
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mation available to the public is to reform the existing bar surveys
about judicial performance into more thorough judicial perform-
ance evaluations, like those already instituted in Alaska, Arizona,
Colorado, and Utah.67  Such systems are designed to “systemati-
cally collect and analyze information about judges’ on-the-bench
performance, and make recommendations about judges to voters
prior to a retention election.”68  Contrary to the relatively simple
and general bar surveys currently used in Nebraska, the judicial
performance evaluations in these states include commissions com-
prised of attorneys, non-attorneys, and judges, who conduct
surveys of court users (including attorneys, litigants, jurors, law en-
forcement personnel, other judges, etc.) on such topics as integrity,
legal competence, communication skills, temperance, punctuality,
administrative skills, case-progression, rates of reversal on appeal,
and continuing education.69  The commissions then compile the
survey results, analyze them, make recommendations about reten-
tion, and make the recommendations and review information avail-
able to the voting public.70
A meaningful judicial performance evaluation system can effec-
tively improve the quality of information available to the voting
public, and also promote public confidence in the information be-
cause the public is so heavily involved in the compilation of the
information, from serving as members on evaluation commissions,
to being surveyed about interactions with judges, to receiving more
meaningful and detailed information.71  The American Judicature
Society’s review and evaluation of the judicial performance evalua-
tion systems in Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, and Utah include thor-
ough and detailed consideration of many elements essential to
effectively implement such a system, including considerations
about the rules and procedures of the evaluation commissions, the
need for adequate funding, the need for detailed and measurable
standards, the importance of confidentiality throughout the evalua-
tion process, the need for effective means of disseminating results
and recommendations, and the need for meaningful training
programs.72
67. See KEVIN M. ESTERLING & KATHLEEN M. SAMPSON, JUDICIAL RETENTION
EVALUATION PROGRAMS IN FOUR STATES: A REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS
xiii-xv (1998).
68. Id. at 4.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 5.
72. Id. at 117-21.
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There are three steps for reforming the current system of judicial
retention elections: (1) educational reform at the academic level to
develop more interested and informed voters in the future; (2) in-
creasing public information available to the current voting public
about the judiciary and judicial retention elections; and (3) improv-
ing the quality of information available.  These three steps can all
work together to bring about systemic change, both in the short
term and in the long term, to address the problems with the current
system of judicial retention elections.  In the short term, steps can
be taken to raise awarness among voters of the current system of
judicial selection and retention through public forums, meaningful
coverage in traditional media, and the efforts of existing voter edu-
cation groups.  By creating a more educated and interested voting
public, both the problems of non-participation and ineffective par-
ticipation can be alleviated.  To be successful, however, it is also
crucial to ensure that the information available to the increasingly
interested and informed voting public is quality information, ad-
dressing as many aspects of judicial performance as possible in as
much detail as possible.  Further, in the long term, steps can be
taken to create a voting public of tomorrow that will better under-
stand the judiciary and its role in government and that will, hope-
fully, take at least as much interest in the importance of judicial
retention elections as in elections for the other two branches of
government.  Perhaps this more educated and informed voting
public will be ready and open to the discussion of whether another
retention system might be more effective than elective retention.
VII. CONCLUSION
Judicial reformers seeking to develop the best possible system of
selecting state court judges must be patient, but they must also
open their minds to the world of possibility and explore ideas for
seeking both short-term and long-term systemic change that, in a
common sense fashion, will address the problems that inhibit the
effectiveness of the current retention election system.  To that end,
improving public awareness about the existing system, its goals,
and its current weaknesses, and implementing steps to address
those weaknesses, will help to keep us moving toward the best pos-
sible system.  Changing attitudes and interest in judicial retention
elections is certainly not an easy task, but it is only through seeking
such change that reformers of an elective retention system can
hope to near its potential effectiveness.
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